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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 39, 1960

Note

Family Law-Legitimation Proceeding By Father
of Child Born out of Wedlock
Plaintiff brought an action in equity against the mother of
two children born out of wedlock for the purpose of having himself declared father of the children, entitled to visitation and all
other rights attendant upon paternity, and for such other and
further relief as equity may require. The trial court decreed that
plaintiff was the father, that he pay $10 per week in support, and
that he be entitled to reasonable visitation. On appeal, Held:
Plaintiff has no cause of action. PaZtani v. Creel, 169 Neb. 591,
100 N.W.2d 736 (1960).
The court reasoned that since this action had not been instituted within the procedure specified by statute- there was no2
authority for its maintainance, citing Timmerman v. Timmerman.
In that case the paternity issue was raised by the father on a cross
petition in a divorce action. Such a proceeding was specifically
provided for by statute which allows the court, upon decreeing a
divorce, to make a further decree concerning the care of any minor
children. 3 The court concluded in dicta, however, that in the
absence of statutory
provision, paternity proceedings could not
4
be maintained.

Although it is conceded that this action was not provided for
by statute, the court might have granted such relief under the
general equity power conferred upon the courts by the state Con1

2
3
4

NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-106 (Reissue 1954) provides that an action
in equity may be brought against a father for support of a child by
the mother, guardian, or next of friend of the child, or by the county
which may be required to support the child.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-113 (Supp. 1957) provides that in addition
to all other provisions of Chapter 13 a complaint accusing a person
of being the father of a child born out of wedlock may be made by
any mother or by the Attorney General of Nebraska.
163 Neb. 704, 81 N.W.2d 135 (1957). See Paltani v. Creel, 169 Neb.
591, 593, 100 N.W.2d 736, 738 (1960).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-311 (Reissue 1952).
Timmerman v. Timmerman, 163 Neb. 704, 710, 81 N.W.2d 135, 139
(1957).

NOTE
stitution.5 The court has often elaborated that equity is conferred
by the Constitution beyond the power of the legislature to control,
and while the legislature may grant jurisdiction as it seems proper,
it cannot take from the courts the broad jurisdiction which the
Constitution has conferred in them. 6 The Nebraska court has been
active in exercising its equitable jurisdiction in the domestic relations field of separate maintainance, 7 and other examples can be
found in supervision and administration of trusts,8 liquidation of
insolvent banks, 9 abuse of attorney's confidential relation with a
client,' 0 adequacy of price in a foreclosure sale," specific performance of an oral contract,' 2 and quieting title.1 3 Thus it would
follow that even though the legislature has specified a means for
determining the paternity of children born out of wedlock, this
would not restrict the court's equitable power to grant the relief
sought herein by the plaintiff father.
Although the court rejects this argument, their conclusion
is justifiable for reasons of public policy. In a paternity or legitimation proceeding, the best interests of the child are paramount,
and any determination regarding support and visitation must yield
to the good of the child. 1 4 The record shows that the mother receives a salary of $320 per month, and that the children are cared
for during the day by their grandmother. The record further
shows that the father used an assumed name when he began to
date the mother, that he was then married and the father of four
legitimate children, and that he has since been divorced by his
wife in which proceeding he was denied visitation rights to his

5 NEB. CONST. art V, § 9.
6 As merely trepresentative of a line of cases so holding, see State
ex Tel. Wright v. Barney, 133 Neb. 676, 276 N.W. 676 (1937).
7 See Scott v. Scott, 153 Neb. 906, 907, 46 N.W.2d 627, 629-30 (1951),

citing additional authority.
8 See Burnham v. Bennison, 121 Neb. 291, 236 N.W. 745 (1931); and Clark

v. Lincoln Liberty Life Ins. Co., 139 Neb. 65, 296 N.W. 449 (1941).
9 See State ex rel. Sorenson v. Farmers' State Bank, 121 Neb. 532, 237
N.W. 857 (1931).
10 See Hall v. Hall, 123 Neb. 280, 242 N.W. 607 (1932).
11 See County of Nance v. Thomas, 146 Neb. 640, 20 N.W.2d 925 (1945).
12 See Lacy v. Ziegler, 98 Neb. 380, 152 N.W. 792 (1915).
13 See Matteson v. Creighton University, 105 Neb. 219, 179 N.W. 1009
(1920).
'4 Dillman v. Dillman, 105 So.2d 33 (Fla. App. 1958). See also 7 AM.
JUR., Bastards §§ 60, 68 (1937); and 10 C.J.S., Bastards § 17 (1938).
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legitimate children. Thus the court may have concluded that
the two children are satisfactorily supported and cared for by
their mother and grandmother, and that their father's influence
would be neither necessary nor desirable. Such a justification is,
however, hard to reconcile technically with the court's holding
that a valid cause of action was not even pleaded, 15 as fitness of
the parents would be a matter for determination by the trial court,
which would be in a better position to so determine than the
reviewing court.'
Samuel Van Pelt '61

15 Paltani v. Creel, 169 Neb. 591, 594, 100 N.W.2d 736, 738 (1960).

11 See Darwin v. Ganger, 344 P.2d 353, 359 (Cal. App. 1959).

